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bstract: Most international responses
to climate change assume we need a
‘global’ solution. Game theory and
political science both support limiting the ne-
gotiating parties to enable a more rapid and
aggressive response. Given that 90 percent of
emissions come from 12 percent of nations, we
argue if a ‘Baker’s Dozen’ of nations bands to-
gether, they can make great strides in combat-
ing climate change. With aggressive measures,
their action would be suﬃcient to greatly re-
duce the likelihood of additional dangerous cli-
mate change, deﬁned as widespread and
irreversible change. We give three reasons why
these nations should act: ability to act; respon-
sibility to act; self-interest in acting.
Introduction
e projected impact of severe climate
change, the urgency of cutting greenhouse
gas emissions, and the current political en-
vironment oﬀer a unique moment for re-
considering policy options for curbing
global climate change. Most international
responses to climate change assume we need
a ‘global’ solution, in which most if not all of
the world’s nations participate in an emis-
sion reduction agreement. But the majority
of the world’s emissions derive from a hand-
ful of nations, so we may be able to achieve
suﬃcient reductions by involving fewer na-
tions. Limiting the negotiating parties may
enable a more rapid and aggressive response.
is paper asks the question: can and should
a sub-group of nations act together to avoid
further dangerous climate change? We con-
clude yes on both counts. is approach is
not new – we base it on lessons from politi-
cal science and game theory. Our paper seeks
to establish that this approach also has scien-
tiﬁc and moral justiﬁcation. We ﬁrst argue
that if a sub-group of key nations bands to-
gether, they can make great strides in com-
bating climate change; with aggressive
measures, their action would be suﬃcient to
greatly reduce the likelihood of additional
dangerous climate change as we deﬁne it.
Our second major argument addresses why
these key nations should take immediate ac-
tion; we give three reasons. First, the sub-
group is able to signiﬁcantly decrease the
likelihood of dangerous climate changes and
the participation of certain nations is critical.
Second, all key nations bear responsibility
for acting because of their historical or pro-
jected future emissions. ird, it is in the in-
terest of these nations to act to mitigate
dangerous climate change.
Lessons from game theory and political
science
Insights from game theory and political sci-
ence make the case that a core group of na-
tions may be more eﬀective in reaching
quick and ambitious agreements than work-
ing to achieve a global consensus. e major
insight from these literatures is that any
agreement has to be in the best interest of
each of the parties. If a country feels like the
cost of accession to the agreement outweigh
the associated beneﬁts (or beneﬁts from de-
fection outweigh the costs), then the agree-
ment will not form or endure, because
countries will defect, cheat, or refuse to take
part. e following four overlapping lessons
derive from game theory and political sci-
ence literatures and can be used to analyse
international agreements.5
(1) Game theory shows that a large group
negotiation will lead to consensus matching
the aspiration of the least ambitious party.
is is supported by political science: as the
number of interests in a negotiation in-
crease, the harder it is to ﬁnd a combination
of measures that will make each nation bet-
ter oﬀ. If we need to meet ambitious targets,
we would do better to limit the number of
negotiating parties.
(2) When many parties are involved in an
agreement, there is little cost to defection and
little beneﬁt of accession for any individual
actor. is means all nations will have a
strong incentive to free ride, and their defec-
tion (or accession) will have little eﬀect on
other parties. Any agreement will therefore
never be in equilibrium, parties will defect,
and the environmental eﬀect will be minimal.
(3) A more likely long-term, self-enforcing,
and adaptable global solution will arise when
multiple, variable-sized coalitions each de-
termine their own appropriate aspirations
and national actions to meet the set goals.
e likelihood of accession and self-en-
forcement of national actions will be much
higher under this model.6 e more inﬂexible
the policy targets, the less likely a multi-
party solution will form or endure because
nations will not be able to implement na-
tional measures aligned with their interests
and, moreover, their national institutional
capacities.
(4) Some nations will need to pay other na-
tions to keep them as parties. Given the po-
litical debate of global climate change, no
agreement will include lesser-developed na-
tions unless more-developed nations (who,
not coincidentally, have higher historical
emissions) agree to pay them. Game theory,
too, establishes the importance of side pay-
ments from rich nations to keep poorer na-
tions as parties to agreements.7
ese extensive literatures provide one very
important lesson: a global agreement on cli-
mate change is very unlikely, and what will
result will be inadequate and unstable. We
are more likely to see coalitions and parallel
agreements where some countries do more
and all parties take a bottom-up approach
reﬂecting their national incentives and insti-
tutional capabilities.
Empirical evidence also speaks to the utility
of side agreements in international environ-
mental policy. e decade between the estab-
lishment of the climate change framework
convention and the ratiﬁcation of the im-
plementing protocol, and the US’s refusal to
ratify the protocol, are evidence of the diﬃ-
culty of coordinating diverse national inter-
ests.8 e Montreal Protocol, one of the
most successful international environmental
agreements,9 started with just 28 nations.
Recent policy discussions, for example at the
G20 or the L20, have focused on developing
an international climate change policy based
on initial agreements by a select group of na-
tions. However these discussions have oc-
curred under the shadow of on-going
international climate negotiations and there
A
Ignoring climate change will be the
most costly of all possible choices, for
us and our children.
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is signiﬁcant evidence that agreeing to side-
deals prior to wider negotiations could lead
to worse environmental outcomes when
these deals are not contingent on later action
by other negotiating parties.10 We cannot say
how these discussions would have ended had
there been no concurrent global negotiation
process.11
Urgency of and thresholds for required
action
Dangerous climate change is a normative
concept describing a situation where the im-
pacts of climate change have exceeded a level
society has deemed to be acceptable; it is a
value judgment informed by our scientiﬁc
understanding of projected climate change
impacts. No speciﬁc deﬁnition of ‘dangerous
anthropogenic interference’ was delineated
in the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change, in part because
what constitutes ‘dangerous’ can diﬀer based
on diﬀering worldviews, values, geographic
location, or abilities to adapt. We assess what
is dangerous through the lens of human wel-
fare, which we consider to be normatively
valuable and worth protecting, now and into
the future. Since human welfare relies on
services provided by the earth, the loss of es-
sential services without the possibility of re-
placement, restoration, or substitution
constitutes a dangerous impact.
Given the goal of avoiding further danger-
ous climate change, scholars have worked
on deﬁning the interrelated physical metrics
of an acceptable temperature rise, deter-
mining what the associated atmospheric sta-
bilisation level would be, and then estimating
what annual emissions pathway or cumula-
tive emissions budget would enable us to
keep to that stabilisation target. ese studies
converge on some targets for allowable
temperature change, stabilisation concen-
tration, and emissions levels. We note that
these targets are still uncertain and fraught
with value judgments, especially with regard
to the embedded assumptions about accept-
able levels of risk. To produce a policy-rele-
vant cumulative emissions budget, we
specify (a) an acceptable temperature rise,
and (b) a long-term atmospheric carbon di-
oxide stabilisation level and the short-term
overshoot of the stabilisation target.
We set our target stabilisation temperature
at 1 degree Celsius above 2000 levels. Our
target translates to ~1.6 degrees above pre-
industrial temperatures, slightly below the
2-degree EU policy target and roughly
equivalent to the 1.5-degree limit proposed
by the Alliance of Small Island States.12 We
follow other studies drawing on the IPCC’s
“Reasons for Concern” as a way to deﬁne
what temperature change could be consid-
ered “dangerous” if sustained over the long-
term13 ey represent the developers’ best
approximation regarding the magnitude of
risk in each category we can expect at diﬀer-
ent temperature levels. For our purposes, we
consider running a “severe risk” within these
Reasons for Concern as an appropriate
threshold for dangerous because, as we will
show, this would trigger impacts that
threaten the irreversible loss of services im-
portant to many people’s welfare.
A recent update of the temperature change
that would induce severe risk in each Rea-
son for Concern gives a range of 1 – 2.5 de-
grees warming above 2000.14 Within that
range, where we should set the threshold de-
pends on value judgments about the relative
importance of each Reason for Concern.
Setting a threshold at 1 degree above 2000
would avoid running a severe risk for all.
Even at this level, we will face a litany of im-
pacts and a greater than 1-degree rise could
result in far worse consequences due to non-
linearities in the climate system and the sur-
prises they could bring.
With a 1-degree above 2000 rise in global
average temperature, we will likely experi-
ence signiﬁcant, widespread impacts and as-
sociated risks to unique and threatened
ecosystems, including more frequent and
extensive coral bleaching and increased vul-
nerability of Arctic and small island com-
munities. We will also experience increased
intensities in extreme weather events, such
as cyclones, heat waves, droughts, and
ﬂoods, which will in turn cause more deaths,
injuries, and damage to property. People
living in poor, low-lying, low-latitude areas
will run the highest risk, but people in rich
nations are not immune to vulnerabilities (as
evidenced, for example, by deaths from the
heat waves in Europe in 2003).
Perhaps most salient to our argument, with
a 1-degree rise, we will run a moderately
signiﬁcant risk of large-scale discontinuities
in the climate system, including such im-
pacts as partial or full deglaciation of the
Greenland and West Antarctic Ice Sheets. If
this melting were to occur, sea levels could
rise many meters and life-sustaining ocean
currents could be disrupted.15 A large portion
of the earth’s freshwater has, for many, many
years been trapped in these ice sheets.16
ese reservoirs of ice serve multiple physi-
cal functions including the storage of water
and reﬂection of sunlight. A number of
large-scale impacts would result from the
loss of these ice sheets. eir complete melt-
ing could cause a sea level rise of up to 12
meters, while partial melting, predicted to
occur over centuries, could cause a sea level
rise of up to 6 meters. is rise would per-
manently ﬂood many coastal and low-lying
areas, including New Orleans, the Nether-
lands, Bangladesh, and most low-lying,
small island nations. is would aﬀect any
nation with a coast, which depends upon
coastal infrastructure (such as ports in near-
by nations or trading partners), or which
cannot adapt to rising sea levels. Secondly,
the inﬂux of freshwater could change global
ocean circulation. Climate change-induced
melting of ice will aﬀect ocean currents by
causing an inﬂux of less dense freshwater.
Similarly, stratiﬁcation of the ocean’s water
will be fortiﬁed by warming of surface water,
preventing mixing. e ocean is one of the
planet’s most important carbon sinks. Ocean
circulation regulates the contact of deep
ocean water with the atmosphere, governing
carbon uptake by the ocean. An alteration
of this carbon exchange will decrease the
amount of carbon dioxide taken out of the
atmosphere by the ocean. e third wide-
spread impact caused by the partial loss of
the ice sheets is loss of snow/ice cover. Loss
of snow/ice cover causes a positive feedback
by reducing the Earth’s reﬂectivity, therefore
causing more of the sun’s heat to be
absorbed. is feedback will accelerate cli-
mate change.
Distressingly, warming estimated as ‘in the
pipeline’ is already slightly over this 1-degree
target.17 In other words, this amount of
warming will likely occur even if we could
freeze atmospheric concentration of carbon
dioxide at today’s level of 385 ppm CO2 be-
cause of inertia in the climate system (com-
pare with pre-industrial levels of about 280
ppm). Based on Solomon et al, Meinshau-
sen el al. and Hansen et al., we set our long-
term stabilisation target at no more than
current concentrations.18
e immense inertias in both the climate
and social systems require us to exceed the
long-term target by a certain amount for a
certain amount of time while policy
measures take eﬀect and past emissions em-
bedded in the climate system run their
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The issue of climate change is one
that we ignore at our own peril.
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course.19 e lower and shorter the over-
shoot, the smaller the probability of wide-
spread, irreversible change.20 In our scenario,
the overshoot peaks at ~427 ppm CO2 in
2050, and declines thereafter, achieving sta-
bilisation back at 385 ppm CO2 around
2150.21
Given the limits we have determined about
temperatures and the associated stabilisation
overshoot scenario, we are now prepared to
set an appropriate level of total global emis-
sions between the years 2000 – 2050; a value
we will refer to as cumulative emissions. Nu-
merous studies have estimated the cumula-
tive emissions we can generate over the
remainder of the ﬁrst half of this century. To
meet the stabilisation level we have chosen,
the cumulative global emissions budget for
carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel
consumption over the period 2000 – 2050 is
around 290 gigatons carbon (GtC)22
Our proposal: A side agreement
Our proposal is for a sub-group of nations to
make a side agreement and thereby greatly
decrease the likelihood of further dangerous
climate change. is section makes the
scientiﬁc case for our approach. As relatively
few nations are responsible for the vast ma-
jority of global emissions, international
agreements to reduce those emissions sig-
niﬁcantly do not require the involvement of
all nations. As Figure 1 illustrates, we gain a
signiﬁcant amount of leverage from surpris-
ingly few nations, with 90 percent of emis-
sions coming from 12 percent of nations.23
e ﬁgure shows the cumulative emissions
of countries ranked by their national annual
emissions in 2004.
Figure 1: Cumulative global emissions by
number of nations counted. Vertical line
delineates the top thirteen global emitters, a
group we refer to as the ‘Baker’s Dozen’. Note
that the x-axis is presented on a log scale.
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Model
We have two criteria for an eventual side
agreement. First, it must be able to get glo-
bal emissions within limits to meet our cu-
mulative emissions budget. Second, the
called-for measures must be within reason-
able bounds of technical feasibility. For the
reasons explained above, we limit the num-
ber of actors in the agreement. For our
model, we selected the minimum number of
nations required by ranking countries by
their current annual emissions; we discuss
this a bit later.
A number of possible scenarios of national-
level action emerge to cut emissions of car-
bon dioxide from fossil fuel consumption.
e question is which option can keep us
below our deﬁned 290 GtC cap. We model
scenarios varying ﬁve parameters: (i) coun-
tries involved, (ii) required annual emissions
reductions, (iii) necessary annual sequestra-
tion, (iv) the year in which emissions peak,
and (v) the year in which sequestration be-
gins. We set a number of conditions: (a)
emissions reductions cannot exceed 5 per-
cent a year, (b) sequestration potential can-
not exceed n*5 percent of 2000 emissions
levels, where n is the number of years after
sequestration started (so the ﬁrst year, a na-
tion sequesters the equivalent of 5 percent
of its 2000 emissions, the second year 10
percent, the third year 15 percent, and so on
until 2050), and (c) wealthier nations have
to start reducing emissions and sequestering
earlier than developing nations. While the
bounds for emissions and sequestration are
aggressive, they fall within the range deemed
reasonable by climate scholars and industry
analysts.24
ese scenarios are
based on a simple mo-
del of national carbon
dioxide emissions from
fossil fuel consump-
tion, cement manu-
facturing, and gas
ﬂaring using data on
past emissions by
countries.25 We separat-
ed countries into two
development categories
where most developed
are countries consid-
ered high income per
the World Development Indicators, and
least developed are all others.26 We grouped
the 27 European Union countries and con-
sidered them as one entity; and we removed
Iran from the sub-group. We calculated the
emissions growth rate over the period 2002–
2004 to extrapolate emissions in 2005–
2009. Our model disaggregates required
emissions cuts by country, given a future
date after which emissions must decline (cal-
led the peak year) and a future date at which
sequestration must begin (called the seque-
stration year). Emissions decline at a con-
stant annual rate after the peak year until the
nation’s emissions reach zero. Every year
after the sequestration year, a nation’s seque-
stration ca- pacity increases a set percentage
of its year 2000 emissions. We assume emis-
sions from nations not within the Baker’s
Dozen would continue to grow at the glo-
bal average historical rate of over 3 percent a
year.27
With these assumptions, we ﬁnd a group of
only thirteen nations is necessary to stay
below the cap and keep reductions and se-
questration within reasonable bounds (re-
presented by the vertical line in Figure 1).
While these nations must abide by strictures,
emissions from the rest of the world can
continue growing at historical rates. is
group, which we refer to as the Baker’s
Dozen – the US, the EU-27, China, Japan,
Russia, India, Canada, South Korea, South
Africa, Mexico, Indonesia, Australia, and
Brazil – must agree to aggressive annual re-
ductions (5 percent) starting in 2012 for de-
veloped nations and 2015 for developing
nations. As shown in Table 1, to meet the
cumulative emissions cap of 290 GtC, these
reductions need to be coupled with aggres-
sive sequestration (5 percent of 2000 level
emissions, growing at an additional 5 per-
cent each year thereafter) starting in 2015
for developed nations and 2030 for develop-
ing nations. Reducing emissions could be
achieved by, for instance, improving energy
eﬃciency or switching to low-carbon fuel
sources. Carbon sequestration involves re-
moving carbon already emitted from the at-
mosphere in order to achieve a negative rate
of emission growth; examples include car-
bon capture and storage and reforestation.
In this scenario, the thirteen nations must se-
quester 132 Gt C by 2050; which seems to be
within the bounds of estimated global poten-
tial.28 By 2050, these nations would be seques-
tering 8 Gt C per year. Studies seem optimistic
that research and development will reduce
costs of carbon sequestration technologies and
these, combined with eﬃciency, better agri-
cultural and forestry practices, and fuel
switches, can bring us within the required
bounds,29 although others are more skeptical.30
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Why key nations should (and must) act to
prevent DCC
Having established that key nations can act
to make signiﬁcant gains in averting dange-
rous climate change, we identify three sepa-
rate reasons why they should act.
Preventing further dangerous climate change
requires the action of essential nations
e nations in the Baker’s Dozen have it in
their power to eﬀectively prevent further
dangerous changes. Signiﬁcant action has to
be taken now if we are to eﬀectively combat
dangerous climate change. Pumping ever
more greenhouse gases into the atmosphere
locks in further warming and all its associ-
ated impacts. e current growth in global
emissions is increasing the likelihood of ir-
reversible, dangerous changes and decreasing
the likelihood we will be able to adapt. We
believe the physical and moral necessity of
preventing the worst outcomes of dangerous
climate change is so urgent it should trump
other considerations normally embedded in
climate agreements, if (and only if ) those
considerations are stumbling blocks for im-
mediate action. Arguments from other areas
of policy making substantiate the justiﬁca-
tion for prioritising action when a crisis
threatens.31
e Baker’s Dozen are among the most able
to act to prevent dangerous climate change.
e rich, highest-emitting nations have
money to invest, e.g., in the research and de-
velopment of clean technologies, and they
have consumption habits that can be altered
to reduce per capita emissions, e.g., eating
less meat and instigating energy eﬃciency
standards; while the highest emitting devel-
oping nations have the most potential for
changing their development paths to less
carbon-intensive ones, e.g., by adopting car-
bon-free energy technologies developed in
the richer nations or adopting eﬃciency
codes for buildings.
Some nations within the Baker’s Dozen are
essential parties because without them, no
agreement will prevent dangerous climate
change. Because the currency we need to re-
duce is cumulative emissions from 2000-
2050, the most important actors are those
who are – or who will be – the largest emit-
ters over that period. By paring down the
subgroup to a minimal thirteen, our model
shows we cannot avoid further dangerous
climate change without signiﬁcant action by
all these players. If we expand the number
of nations slightly, however, for example ad-
ding in the next 7 top emitters (Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Ukraine, Taiwan, ailand, Turkey,
and Kazakhstan), the only nations with the
power to cause a failure if one were to defect
are China, the US, and the EU-27. China is
always an essential player; without action
from China, the rest of the world will have
a diﬃcult time staying under the cap even if
they enact signiﬁcant cuts and sequestration
eﬀorts.
e thirteen nations included in our model
are a rough approximation of what a sub-
group might look like. We ﬁnd thirteen par-
ties are minimally necessary to achieve the
cap and meet our conditions regarding emis-
sions cuts and sequestration. We are inter-
ested in establishing the minimal number of
parties because a smaller group has advan-
tages, as we have already discussed. e exact
membership of a sub-group is not prescribed
by our approach – we could come up with a
diﬀerent list and defend it both empirically
and normatively, for example by substituting
one country for one or more with similar
emissions. Nonetheless, we believe the Bak-
er’s Dozen is a sub-group with bite: with just
thirteen nations, we capture 83 percent of
global emissions; to get just 9 percent more
would require doubling the number of ne-
gotiating parties. Further, these nations are
particularly able to act and, as we discuss
next, bear disproportionate responsibility.
Responsibility supports necessity of action by key
nations
We believe responsibility for preventing the
crossing of the dangerous threshold lies with
those most responsible for contributing to
the problem and those who will contribute
to the problem if they do not signiﬁcantly
rein in their emissions. e wealthier nations
bear the greatest historical responsibility for
increasing the atmospheric concentrations
of greenhouse gases, which is why mitigating
dangerous climate change is such a pressing
issue in the ﬁrst place. Moreover, their
greater wealth is due in large part to these
emissions. ey therefore have more
responsibility for taking action. e less de-
veloped nations in the Baker’s Dozen accrue
responsibility to act as well because of their
projected future emissions. ey are project-
ed to have signiﬁcant emissions growth if
they develop on a business-as-usual, carbon-
intensive pathway. As a result of their
economic development, these nations’ emis-
sions are growing at rates far higher than de-
veloped nations. Indeed, in 2008, China
surpassed the US in terms of absolute emis-
sions (though per capita is still far lower).
Concerns about equity go hand-in-hand
with historical responsibility. Negotiations
are often bogged down by concerns that de-
veloping nations will be condemned to
lower levels of economic development if
they are required to curb their emissions.
Equity and fairness considerations, it seems,
suggest less developed nations should have
the same rights and abilities to develop that
wealthier countries had, especially since their
emissions have to be reduced because of the
emissions (and associated development) of
richer nations. We have shown, however, if
key developing nations continue on emis-
sions-intensive development paths, danger-
ous climate change will ensue; their
involvement in an agreement is crucial.
e seeming contradiction between moral
and pragmatic arguments regarding develop-
ing nations’ emissions pathways can at least
in part be reconciled by an agreement
among the Baker’s Dozen with diﬀerential
responsibilities for less and more developed
Intergenerational Justice Review
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Table 1: Cumulative global emissions by 2050 with thirteen minimal nations in agreement.
Values in white fall below the cumulative emissions cap of 290 Gt C required to avoid further
dangerous climate change. e grey box indicates sequestration and emission reductions within
reasonable bounds of technical feasibility.
Given the nature and magnitude of the
challenge, national action alone is insufficient.
No nation can address this challenge on
its own. No region can insulate itself from
these climate changes. That is why we need
to confront climate change within a global
framework.
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parties. Our proposal includes diﬀerential
responsibilities for action based on a nation’s
level of development and corresponding
contributions to climate change. For exam-
ple, our approach allows developing nations
to have more time to begin cuts; developed
nations will make side-payments to less de-
veloped nations to keep them as parties to
the agreement; and the parties involved can
negotiate future reevaluations to assess if de-
veloping countries, despite legitimate eﬀorts
to cut emissions, are falling behind eco-
nomically, in which case developed nations
should have to cut more.
It is in the self-interest of key nations to act
To protect their national interests, the na-
tions in the Baker’s Dozen should act to pre-
vent dangerous climate change. As we have
presented above, dangerous climate change
will cause widespread negative impacts
around the world. e nations in the Baker’s
Dozen will only bear a fraction of the global
damages from climate change, but as in-
creasing evidence suggests the costs could be
enormous and, if severe climate change oc-
curs, it could be socially destabilising on a
global scale.32 While the key nations will
likely not suﬀer the worst impacts of danger-
ous climate change relative to all nations
when measured as percentage of GDP, per-
centage of population aﬀected, or severity of
impacts, they will nonetheless experience
signiﬁcant negative impacts. Dangerous cli-
mate change is a global threat and the extent
of the national-level projected impacts can
be interpreted as threats to national security.
As such it is in every nation’s self-interest to
act to prevent it. e self-interest argument
is also one about moral duties. ese coun-
tries have a duty to protect their own citi-
zens.
It may seem unfair to focus on just a few na-
tions – whether the Baker’s Dozen or an-
other sub-group – when all nations arguably
have a duty to act to prevent further dange-
rous climate change. We believe that the
duty to act also involves entering into the
most promising negotiations with other
countries seeking to fulﬁll their duties. is
implies that nations may be morally obligat-
ed to enter into side agreements if these are
the most promising way to advance serious
climate change solutions. Further, the nature
of the problem we are facing – its severity
and its urgency – means that we have little
time to worry about only ‘doing our fair
share’. Some nations are going to have to do
more than others in order to prevent further
110
dangerous climate change. In part, the duty
of those who act is reinforced by the fact that
other nations are not acting – the fact that
some nations are not taking action makes
the problem all the more urgent and dire,
and reinforces the moral obligation of those
nations that can and will act.
Moreover, if we focus on just the nations in
the Baker’s Dozen, it is apparent that ignor-
ing the rest of the world raises less of a con-
cern than it might seem to. It is unclear
exactly what fairness dictates in mitigating
climate change (decades of climate debate
speak to this), but the rest of the world’s his-
torical and current emissions are so small
compared to the Baker’s Dozen that leaving
them out is not all that far from ‘fair’. Of
course, over time, the countries included in
the sub-group would have to be adapted as
new large emitters emerge, but nothing with-
in our approach prohibits this and we see
room for multiple coalitions forming à la the
Baker’s Dozen.
Conclusion
While a side agreement would require sig-
niﬁcant and urgent reductions in emissions
from its signers, we conclude that it is pos-
sible to avoid further dangerous climate
change if a sub-group of thirteen nations –
minimally the US, EU-27, Japan, China,
India, Russia, Canada, South Korea, South
Africa, Mexico, Indonesia, Australia, and
Brazil – take immediate action. is action
would involve deep and rapid cuts in emis-
sions in the short-term and large-scale car-
bon sequestration in the medium-term. A
side deal circumvents the collective action
problem plaguing global climate negotia-
tions and, as both game theory and political
science teach us, may enable more rapid and
aggressive agreements.
e normative case for the approach is built
on the principle that every nation has a duty
to act, but we are in such a dire situation
that pursuing second-best solutions is ap-
propriate. Key moral concerns that have
dominated climate discussions should come
secondary to achieving action; but we show
that some can be integrated with an even-
tual side deal policy and can remain the aim
of long-term climate change policy. Moral
concerns, and particularly concerns about
justice, can “muddy the picture and threat-
en to interfere with eﬀorts to negotiate an
eﬀective climate change regime in the fu-
ture,”33 but they need not conﬂict with prag-
matic approaches. We believe that ﬁnding
ways in which pragmatic concerns and
moral considerations align can strengthen
the case for eﬀective climate policies.
We urge the current global climate change
negotiating forum – culminating in Copen-
hagen in December 2009 – to be a venue
which facilitates side deals. We fear a sole
focus of achieving a global consensus on
binding targets will not achieve the level and
speed of reductions needed, nor result in
long-term buy-in by key nations. While im-
perfect, we believe our approach could be a
way to break out of the collective action stale-
mate and prevent widespread, irreversible
impacts.
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17. See Solomon et al. 2007 / Hansen et al.
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32. Pachauri/Reisinger 2007; Stern 2007.
33. Posner/Sunstein 2007: 20.
References:
Aldy, Joseph E. / Stavins, Robert N. (2007):
Architectures for Agreement. Addressing
Global Climate Change in the Post-Kyoto
World. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Barrett, Scott (2001): International Co-
operation for Sale. In: European Economic
Review. Vol. 45 (10/2001), 1835-1850.
Barrett, Scott (2006): Environment and
Statecraft. e Strategy of Environmental
Treaty-Making. In: Journal of International
Relations and Development. No. 9, 103-6.
Den Elzen, Michel / Meinshausen, Malte
(2006): Multi-Gas Emission Pathways for
Meeting the EU 2 Degree C Climate Tar-
get. In: Schnellnhuber, Hans Joachim. /
Cramer, Wolfgang P. / Nakicenovic, Nebojsa
/ Wigley, Tom / Yohe, Gary (eds.): Avoiding
Dangerous Climate Change. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press.
Electric Power Research Institute (2007):
e Power to Reduce CO2 Emissions. Palo
Alto.
Hansen, James / Sato, Makiko / Kharecha,
Pushker / Beerling, David / Berner, Robert
/ Masson-Delmotte, Valerie / Pagani, Mark
/ Raymo, Maureen / Royer, Dana / Zachos,
James (2008): Target Atmospheric CO2.
Where Should Humanity Aim? In: e
Open Atmospheric Science Journal. No. 2,
217-31.
Hoel, Michael (1989): Global Environmen-
tal Problems: e Eﬀects of Unilateral Ac-
tions Taken by One Country:
Bedriftsøkonomisk Institutt.
Luers, Amy / Mastrandrea, Michael / Hay-
hoe, Katherine/ Frumhoﬀ, Peter (2007):
How to Avoid Dangerous Climate Change.
A Target for US Emissions Reductions. San
Francisco, CA: Union for Concerned Scien-
tists.
Meinshausen, Malte / Hare, Bill / Wigley,
Tom / Van Vuuren, Detlef / Den Elzen, Mi-
chael / Swart, Rob (2006): Multi-Gas Emis-
sions Pathways to Meet Climate Targets. In:
Climatic Change. Vol. 75 (1/2006), 151-94.
Metz, Bert / Davidson, Ogunlade R. / Co-
ninck, Helen D. / Loos, Manuela / Meyer,
Leo (eds.) (2005): IPCC Special Report on
Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage. Cam-
bridge, UK and New York, USA: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Metz, Bert / Davidson, Ogunlade R. / Co-
ninck, Helen D. / Loos, Manuela / Meyer,
Leo (eds.) (2007): Climate Change 2007:
Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribu-
tion of Working Group III to the Fourth As-
sessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Metz, Bert / Van Vuuren, Detlef P. (2006):
How, and at What Costs, Can Low-Level
Stabilisation Be Achieved? An Overview. In:
Schnellnhuber, Hans. Joachim. / Cramer,
Wolfgang P. / Nakicenovic, Nebojsa / Wi-
gley, Tom / Yohe, Gary (eds.): Avoiding
Dangerous Climate Change. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press.
Pachauri, Rajenda K. / Reisinger, Andy
(2007): Climate Change 2007. Synthesis
Report: Contribution of Working Groups I,
II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change. Geneva: IPCC.
Parry, Martin L. / Canziani, Osvaldo F. / Pa-
lutikof, Jean P. / Linden, Paul V D. / Han-
son, Clair E. (eds.) (2007): Climate Change
2007. Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerabil-
ity. Contribution of Working Group II to
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
Posner, Eric A. / Sunstein, Cass R. (2007):
Climate Change Justice. In: University of
Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working
Paper No. 354 University of Chicago, Pub-
lic Law Working Paper No. 177.
Posner, Eric A. / Vermeule, Adrian (2003):
Accommodating Emergencies. In: Univer-
sity of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper.
Rai, Varun / Victor, David / urber, Mark
(2009): Carbon Capture and Storage at
Scale. Lessons from the Growth of Analo-
gous Energy Technologies. In: Program on
Energy and Sustainable Development: Stan-
ford University.
Raupach, Michael R. / Marland, Gregg /
Ciais, Philippe / Le Quéré, Corinne / Cana-
dell, Josep G. / Klepper, Gernot / Field,
Christopher B. (2007): Global and Region-
al Drivers of Accelerating CO2 Emissions.
In: Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences. Vol. 104 (24/2007).
Rogelj, Joeri / Hare, Bill / Nabel, Julia /
Macey, Kirsten / Schaeﬀer, Michiel / Mark-
mann, Kathleen / Meinshausen, Malte
(2009): Halfway to Copenhagen, No Way
to 2 [Deg]C. In: Nature Reports (doi:
10.1038/climate.2009.57).
Sands, Philippe (2003): Principles of Inter-
Intergenerational Justice Review
Volume 9 · Issue 3/2009
national Environmental Law. Second Edi-
tion. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Smith, Joel B. / Schneider, Stephen H. / Op-
penheimer, Michael / Yohe, Gary W. / Hare,
William / Mastrandrea, Michael D. / Pat-
wardhan, Anand / Burton, Ian / Corfee-
Morlot, Jan / Magadza, Chris H D. (2009):
Assessing Dangerous Climate Change
through an Update of the Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) “Rea-
sons for Concern”. In: Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences. Vol: 106
(11/2009), 4133.
Solomon, Susan / Plattner, Gian-Kasper /
Knutti, Reto / Friedlingstein, Pierre (2009):
Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon
Dioxide Emissions. Proceedings of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences. Vol. 106
(6/2009), 1704-9.
Solomon, Susan / Qin, Dahe / Manning,
Martin / Alley, Richard B. / Berntsen, Terje
112
/ Bindoﬀ, Nathaniel L. / Chen, Zhenlin /
Chithaisong, Amnat / Gregory, Jonathan M.
/ Hegerl, Gabriele C. (2007): Climate
Change 2007. e Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cam-
bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Stern, Nicholas (2007): e Economics of
Climate Change. e Stern Review. Cam-
bridge University Press.
Sunstein, Cass R. (2009): Minimalism at
War. Supreme Court Review.
Victor, David G. (2006): Toward Eﬀective
International Cooperation on Climate
Change. Numbers, Interests and Institu-
tions. In: Global Environmental Politics.
Vol. 6 (3/2006), 90-103.
World Bank (2009): World Development
Indicators.World Bank.
World Resources Institute (2007): Earth
Trends. World Resources Institute.
Submitted: 19 March 2009
Accepted after revisions: 10 August 2009
Kirsten Oleson is a
Post-Doctoral Research
Fellow with the Stan-
ford Institute for Eco-
nomic Policy Research.
Lauren Hartzell is a
post-doctoral research
associate in the Pro-
gram on values in Society and the Program
on Environment, University of Washington,
Seattle.
Michael Mastrandrea is a consulting assi-
stant professor at the Woods Institute for the
Environment, Stanford University.
Contact details: Dr. Kirsten Oleson, Stan-
ford Institute for Economic Policy Research,
Landau Economics Building, Stanford Uni-
versity, Stanford CA 94305
Email: koleson@stanford.edu
limate change has witnessed a
rapid rise in public awareness with-
in the last years and months. e
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in
2007 marked a breakthrough in this devel-
opment as the true magnitude and the pos-
sibly devastating consequences of climate
change were scientiﬁcally underlined in pub-
lic. is led to a short-lived ﬂurry of activ-
ities and declarations to mitigate global
climate change by politicians around the
globe. Most of the promises and declarations
made were soon curbed or forgotten in the
face of the emerging global ﬁnancial and
economic crisis. One of the few lasting po-
sitives regarding the upcoming negotiations
for a post-Kyoto agreement in Copenhagen
are the change of the US climate policy after
the election of President Obama and ﬁrst sig-
nals hinting at Chinas willingness to talk
about a deﬁnite date for a peak of their emis-
sions. If the Copenhagen meeting does not
render decisive results, future generations
will most likely pay the price for this lack of
action, making climate change a key issue of
intergenerational justice.
Fortunately for future generations it seems
that the science sector is living up to its role
of broaching relevant issues without follow-
ing public attention cycles, and has not
abandoned the topic. Nevertheless, the
rising number of publications makes it in-
creasingly diﬃcult to decide which publica-
tions are relevant and path breaking for the
debate.
e anthology Political eory and Global
Climate Change, edited by Steve Vanderhei-
den of the University of Colorado at Boul-
der, is one of those publications potentially
oﬀering useful insights by approaching the
topic from a new angle. It does so by apply-
ing green political theory to global climate
change.
Composed of eight English articles, the an-
thology aims to oﬀer interdisciplinary and
innovative approaches to the normative
questions arising when dealing with global
climate change and its consequences. e
philosophy behind the book is that, in order
to comprehend the nature of global climate
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Steve Vanderheiden (ed.):
Political Theory and Global Climate Change
Reviewed by Patrick Wegner
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